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Abstract 
Since Adam Smith’s time, the division of labor in production has increased significantly, while 
information processing has become an important part of work. This paper examines whether the need 
to coordinate an increasingly complex division of labor has raised the demand for clerical office 
workers, who process information that is used to coordinate production. In order to examine this 
question empirically, I introduce a measure of the complexity of an industry’s division of labor that 
uses the Herfindahl index of occupations it employs, excluding clerks and managers. Using US data I 
find that throughout the 20th century more complex industries employed relatively more clerks, and 
recent Mexican data shows a similar relationship. The relative complexity of industries is persistent 
over time and correlated across these two countries. I further document the relationship between 
complexity and the employment of clerks using an early information technology (IT) revolution that 
took place around 1900, when telephones, typewriters, and improved filing techniques were 
introduced. This IT revolution raised the demand for clerks in all manufacturing industries, but 
significantly more so in industries with a more complex division of labor. Interestingly, recent 
reductions in the price of IT have enabled firms to substitute computers for clerks, and I find that 
more complex industries have substituted clerks more rapidly. 
 
Keywords:  information processing, division of labor, technological change, organization of 
production 
JEL classification:  J44, M54, D73, O33 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist for their many helpful suggestions. I also thank 
David Autor, Dora Costa, Luis Garicano, Claudia Goldin, Todd Gormley, Alan Manning, Gerard 
Padro-i-Miquel, Michael Piore, Andrea Prat, Peter Temin, Manuel Trajtenberg, John Van Reenen, 
Alex Whalley and seminar and workshop participants at Harvard, LSE, MIT, and SOLE 2006.  An 
earlier version of this paper from April 2004 was entitled: ‘Technology, Complexity and Information: 
the Evolution of Demand for Office Workers’.  
 Guy Michaels is a Research Associate at the Centre for Economic Performance and Lecturer 
in the Economics Department, London School of Economics. 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
© G. Michaels, submitted 2007 
 
ISBN 978 0 85328 024 8 
1 Introduction
Since Adam Smith’s analysis of the pin factory (1776), the division of labor in production
has become much more detailed. Today, the production of most goods involves the coordi-
nation of a wide range of occupations. At the same time, white collar work that involves
information processing and coordination has become important in all firms and organizations
(Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003). This paper examines the extent to which a more complex
division of labor entails higher costs of processing the information that is used to coordinate
production.
Most of the literature on coordination costs and the division of labor is theoretical.
Radner (1992, 1993), Garicano (2000), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) consider
workers’ capacity for processing information and the formation of knowledge hierarchies. In
“The Division of Labor, Coordination, and Knowledge” (1992), Becker and Murphy argue
that the division of labor is constrained by the costs of coordinating specialized workers
and by the availability of information. But it has proved diﬃcult to estimate these costs of
coordination, because of the diﬃculty of measuring the division of labor empirically.1
In this paper, I characterize a production process as complex when it requires a diverse
set of occupations. Specifically, I define the complexity of a manufacturing industry as
one minus the Herfindahl index of the occupations of its employees, excluding managers,
clerks, accountants, and auditors.2 For example, textile and clothing industries employ an
occupationally homogenous workforce and therefore have low complexity. By contrast, man-
ufacturers of transportation equipment employ an occupationally heterogeneous workforce,
so their complexity is high.
How does the complexity of the division of labor aﬀect the demand for information
processing? Consider two factories that employ an equal number of workers; in one factory all
the workers perform the same task, while in the other each worker performs a diﬀerent task.
1Recent work by Garcano and Hubbard (2003), analyzes the division of labor among lawyers, and Du-
ranton and Jayet (2006) find that specialized occupations are more prevalent in large cities.
2Most of the analysis uses fixed 1950 census definitions of industries and occupations.
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In order to eﬀectively coordinate production in the more complex factory, labor has to be
allocated across tasks, diﬀerent complementary inputs need to be acquired and distributed,
and various inventories need to be tracked. Thus, an eﬀective coordination of a more complex
labor force requires more information.
In order to examine the relationship between complexity and demand for information
processing, I consider the employment of clerical oﬃce workers (clerks). Clerks are skilled
workers, who use information technology (IT) equipment to generate, store, and communi-
cate information. The information that clerks process is an intermediate input that facilitates
the coordination of production. Although this paper focuses on the demand for clerks, it also
sheds light on the demand for managers, who analyze the information produced by clerks
and use it to coordinate production.
Production of manufactured goods in US industries has become much more complex from
1860-2000. Over this period, the average complexity of U.S. manufacturing industries has
increased from about 0.4 to 0.78. At the same time, the fraction of clerks in manufacturing
has risen from less than 1 percent to over 11 percent. Although this relationship is suggestive,
many other factors have changed over this period, so I turn to cross-industry comparisons
of complexity and the fraction of clerks employed.
Figure 1 shows that throughout the 20th century more complex industries employed more
clerks. This correlation strengthened considerably over the first half of the 20 century. In
recent decades it appears to have weakened, but in 2000 it was still statistically significant.
The positive correlation between complexity and the demand for clerks is consistent with
the hypothesis that coordination is costly, but it leaves the possibility of reverse causality:
can industries with more clerks aﬀord greater complexity? It is especially diﬃcult to address
this question, since the relative complexity industries is stable over time, likely reflecting
persistent diﬀerences in their production technologies. In absence of exogenous variation in
the level of complexity, I examine whether more complex industries had a latent demand for
information even before it was cost-eﬀective to process information.
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Before 1880 IT equipment was very limited, and so was the use of clerks. But over the
next 30 years telephones, typewriters, and vertical filing techniques came into widespread
use (see Figure 2). As a result of this early IT Revolution, firms started to employ clerks in
tandem with IT equipment to produce information that was used to coordinate production.
Figures 3 and 4 show that the fraction of clerks in manufacturing increased from about 1
percent to over 6 percent from 1880-1910, while their wages relative to production workers
remained stable.3 This evidence suggests that this early IT revolution increased the relative
demand for clerks. More importantly, I find that industries that were more complex in 1880
increased their demand for clerks significantly more than other industries over the next 30
years.
Once firms use information, a further decrease in the eﬀective price of IT equipment may
cause them to substitute it for clerks. This is indeed what happened from 1960-2000, when
the employment share and relative wages of clerks decreased (Figures 3 and 4). This finding
provides a concrete case in which technology and a specific set of skills are substitutes rather
than complements. Interestingly, I find that complex industries increased their demand for
computer personnel (likely correlated with their use of IT equipment) and decreased their
demand for clerks more rapidly than other industries.
In order to further test the hypothesis that diﬀerences in demand for clerks are driven by
underlying technological diﬀerences, I compute measures of complexity using 1990 classifica-
tion of occupations for both the US and Mexico. Despite diﬀerences in the classification of
occupations across the two countries, I find that the cross-industry correlation of complexity
is about 0.3. I also find that average complexity is lower in Mexico, and so is its employment
of clerks. Finally, I find that the relationship between complexity and employment of clerks
is stronger in Mexico, as it had been in the US in past decades when the price of IT was
higher. On the other hand, the relationship between complexity and demand for managers,
that has become increasingly important in the US, was still weaker in Mexico.
3Figure 3 also shows that the employment share of managers and other white-collar employees increased
much more slowly over the same period.
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Finally, I use the 1990 US data to examine a subgroup clerks engaged more directly
in coordination of production. I find that the relationship between complexity and the
employment share of these clerks is stronger than for other types of clerical workers.
Taken together, my results show that the complexity of the division of labor remains an
important determinant of the employment of workers who process information. In 2000, an
increase of standard deviation in complexity is associated with an increase of 1 percentage
point (about 8 percent) in the employment of clerks, and 1.4 percentage points (about 14
percent) in the employment of managers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that
shows the eﬀects of complexity on demand for information processing. Section 3 considers
empirical evidence using US industries over time, two information technology revolutions,
and a comparison of recent US and Mexican data. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Theory of Demand for Information Processing
To frame the key questions of this paper, I construct a framework for analyzing the ef-
fect of technology on the demand for information processing. I conceptualize the process
of manufacturing as consisting of production and coordination. Production includes the
tasks required to physically make the product. The workers who take part in production
are operatives, craftsmen, laborers, and professional workers. Coordination involves gener-
ating, storing, and communicating information that is used to organize production. The
information used to coordinate production is processed by clerks.4
All manufacturing firms need to perform the tasks required for production, but they can
diﬀer in their approach to coordination. One approach, which I call low information intensity,
relies on informal information to coordinate production. For example, this may involve
foremen supervising diﬀerent sections of a plant. This approach typically involves costly
misallocation of resources in production. The second approach relies on high information
4Managers’ role can be seen as using the information processed by clerks to coordinate production. For
simplicity, their tasks are not modeled in this framework.
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intensity in coordination. This requires the firm to employ clerks, who use IT equipment to
provide information that ensures a precise allocation of inputs in production.
Assume firms use labor inputs to produce output using a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) production function:
Yi,j =
∙Z ti,j
0
Li,j (x)
(σ−1)/σ dx
¸σ/(σ−1)
, (1)
where the information intensity i is either high (h) or low (l) and the industry is indexed by
j. The complexity of the production function, ti,j, is the measure of the set of diﬀerent tasks
employed in production. For simplicity, this model considers only labor inputs, rather than
capital inputs, so complexity is closely related to the division of labor. In industry j, a set
of workers of measure Li,j (x) is assigned to task x. The elasticity of substitution between
the diﬀerent tasks is σ, and I assume that tasks are gross substitutes (σ > 1).
I assume that firms using high information intensity execute all tasks correctly, so th,j =
tj. However, firms using low information intensity do not execute all tasks correctly. This
may be due to problems in assigning workers to tasks, providing the right complementary
inputs, or tracking inventories.5 I assume that tl,j = t
γ
j , where γ measures the eﬃciency
of coordination in a low information intensity environment (γ ∈ [0, 1)). For example, if
the content of tasks is easily comprehensible, it may be possible to coordinate work quite
eﬀectively even without much information, so γ may be close to 1.
A firm using high information intensity needs to gather information Ij in proportion to
the size of its workforce and the complexity of the technology it uses:
Ij =
µZ tj
0
Lh,j (x) dx
¶
tj (2)
The assumption that a more complex division of labor requires more information is a key part
of the model. Consider two factories that employ an equal number of workers; in one factory
5For a related discussion see Crémer, Garicano, and Prat (2006).
5
all the workers perform the same task, while in the other each performs a diﬀerent task.
In order to eﬀectively coordinate production in the more complex factory, labor has to be
allocated across tasks, diﬀerent complementary inputs need to be acquired and distributed,
and various inventories need to be tracked. Thus, an eﬀective coordination of a more complex
labor force requires more information.
In order to analyze the demand for information processing, I assume that information is
an intermediate input produced using CES technology:
Ij =
£
α
¡
Lch,j
¢η
+ β
¡
Kch,j
¢η¤1/η , (3)
where Lch,j and K
c
h,j are clerks and IT equipment. The productivity of clerks and IT equip-
ment in producing information is captured by α and β, and the elasticity of substitution
between clerks and information technology is σI = 1/ (1− η). Given a technology tj, a firm
producing with high information intensity solves the following optimization problem:
Min
©
wLh,j + wcLch,j + pK
c
h,j
ª
s.t. : (1)− (3), (4)
where the wage of labor is w, the wage of clerks is wc and the price of information technology
equipment is p. Using the simplifying assumption that all tasks in production are equally
important, Lh,j (x) = Lh,j/tj, and total labor demand is:
Lh,j = t
−1/(σ−1)
j Yj (5)
The demand for clerks and for information technology equipment ("clerical capital") is:
Lch,j = (α+ βφ)
−1/η t(σ−2)/(σ−1)j Yj (6)
Kch,j = (β + α/φ)
−1/η t(σ−2)/(σ−1)j Yj, (7)
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where φ ≡ (βwc/αp)η/(1−η). Hence, the cost of production with high information intensity
is:
Ch,j = t
−1/(σ−1)
j wYj + (α+ βφ)
−1/η t(σ−2)/(σ−1)j wcYj +
+(β + α/φ)−1/η t(σ−2)/(σ−1)j pYj. (8)
As long as the elasticity of substitution is suﬃciently low (σ ≤ 2), the cost function is
decreasing in the level of complexity tj, because the increased eﬃciency of production with
a more complex technology outweighs the additional cost of information associated with it.6
A firm may choose to rely on low information intensity for supervising work. In this
case it fails to execute some tasks correctly, but it does not need to employ clerks or IT
equipment. The labor demand of a firm producing with low information intensity is:
Ll,j = Y t
(σ−γσ−1)/(σ−1)
j , (9)
and its cost function is:
Cl,j = t
(σ−γσ−1)/(σ−1)
j wYj. (10)
Cost decreases in tj as long as the elasticity of substitution between tasks is suﬃciently
low (σ < 1
1−γ ). If σ >
1
1−γ then firms using low information intensity prefer the simplest
technology available.
Using the constant returns to scale property of the production function we can define
the net benefit of switching from low to high information intensity per unit of output as the
diﬀerence between the marginal cost of a unit of output under both strategies:
I∆,j ≡MCl,j −MCh,j = (t(σ−γσ−1)/(σ−1)j − t
−1/(σ−1)
j )w − (11)
− (α+ βφ)−1/η t(σ−2)/(σ−1)j wc − (β + α/φ)
−1/η t(σ−2)/(σ−1)j p
6If σ > 2 then firms using high information intensity prefer a lower level of technology. I assume that
this is not the case.
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Firms employ clerks if and only if I∆,j > 0. Only the firms using high information
intensity employ clerks and information technology equipment, so a decline in the price of
these inputs makes high information intensity more advantageous. In particular, if firms
are using low information intensity, then a fall in the price of IT equipment makes high
information intensity more profitable:
∂I∆,j
∂p
< 0. (12)
Hence, if the price of IT equipment declines, firms may switch from low information intensity
to high information intensity.
Now consider the case where all firms use high information intensity. We can compute
the ratio of clerks to other workers:
cj ≡ Lch,j/Lh,j =
h
α+ β1/(1−η) (wc/αp)
η/(1−η)
i−1/η
tj. (13)
When all firms use high information intensity we obtain the following comparative statics:
∂cj
∂tj
> 0,
∂cj
∂wc
< 0,
∂cj
∂p
> 0,
∂2cj
∂p∂tj
> 0. (14)
Similarly, we can define the intensity of IT equipment as:
kcj ≡ Kch,j/Lh,j. (15)
so when information intensity is high:
∂kcj
∂tj
> 0,
∂kcj
∂wc
> 0,
∂kcj
∂p
< 0,
∂2cj
∂p∂tj
< 0. (16)
We can interpret these results in the following way. First, if firms use high information
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intensity, more complex industries use more clerks and more IT equipment. Section 3.1
tests this prediction using variation across US manufacturing industries throughout the 20th
century. This data also allows us to examine how the employment of clerical workers, relative
to other workers, varies with the complexity of the division of labor.
Second, consider a sharp fall in the price of IT equipment; such a decline may cause
firms to switch from low information intensity, where no clerks are used, to high information
intensity. Once information intensity is high, more firms with more complex industries use
more clerks. Thus, if complexity reflects persistent technological diﬀerences, industries that
were more complex before the fall in the price of IT increase their employment of clerks more
than other firms. Section 3.2 considers an early IT Revolution that took place from 1880-
1910, and reduced the eﬀective price of IT equipment. I examine how this change caused
firms to increase their information intensity and their use of clerks, and how these changes
were more pronounced in more complex industries.
Third, once firms use high information intensity, a further decline in the price of IT
equipment causes them to substitute IT equipment for clerks; moreover, this substitution
takes place diﬀerentially more in complex industries. In Section 3.3 examine such a change
using the recent computer revolution. In absence of information on industry-level use of
IT equipment, I use the employment of computer personnel as a proxy for the use of such
equipment.
Finally, my interpretation of the model assumes that diﬀerences in complexity reflect
diﬀerences in complexity. Section 3.4 compares the US industries with Mexican industries
in 1990. I examine whether the measures of industry complexity are correlated across the
two economies, and whether variations in complexity correspond to the fraction of clerks
employed.
I begin my examination of complexity by defining the empirical measure of complexity
and examining its relationship to the employment of clerks.
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3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 US Industries Over Time
Technological complexity is a measure of the variety of tasks required to physically make
products. In terms of labor inputs, complex production processes involve an occupationally
diverse workforce. Accordingly, I define complexity as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of oc-
cupations of employees in each industry. This measure is designed to reflect occupational
heterogeneity in production, but not in coordination; therefore, I calculate this measure ex-
cluding managers, clerks, accountants and auditors. My main source of data is the 1 percent
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the decennial censuses (Ruggles et al.
1997). Since occupational definitions change over time, I use the IPUMS 1950 classification
of occupations and industries throughout the paper.7 The Data Appendix discusses the
construction of samples and the complexity measure.
Appendix Table A1 shows the industries with particularly high or low levels of complexity
from 1880-2000. During the early 20th century complexity was positively correlated with
using continuous-process or batch-production technologies (Chandler 1977; Goldin and Katz
1998), as industries using these technologies ranked above the median level of complexity.8
In subsequent decades transportation industries ranked among the most complex industries,
while textile and clothing industries were among the least complex.
Comparisons of industries and occupations over time should be taken with caution, even
though they rely on a fixed classification of occupations. With this caveat in mind, note that
complexity appears to have risen over time (Table 1). Complexity rankings are also very
consistent over time: from 1880-1940 the decade-by-decade correlation of complexity ranged
from 0.5-0.9, and since 1940 it has exceeded 0.9.
In order to examine the relationship between complexity and information processing, I
7Computer-related occupations are the only exception to this rule, since they are only defined from 1970
onwards.
8Industries using continuous-process or batch-production technologies include beverages, dairy products,
grain-mill product, paints and varnishes and petroleum refining.
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investigate the employment of clerks. An examination of clerical occupations shows that
they use IT equipment to generate, store, and communicate information, which is used for
coordination. Throughout the 20th century clerical occupations in manufacturing included
stenographers, typists, secretaries, bookkeepers, shipping and receiving clerks, and oﬃce ma-
chine operators. In recent decades, clerks have often also been employed in record processing,
material recording, scheduling and distribution, providing information, and message distri-
bution (Hunt and Hunt 1986).
Clerks diﬀer from other white collar workers, since their main task is to process infor-
mation that is used to coordinate production. By contrast, engineers and other professional
workers typically process information that is used to design products or a processes. Sales
workers may also process information as part of their work, but their main objective is to sell
products. Clerks also diﬀer from managers, since managers perform actual coordination and
supervision. However, during the 19th century the distinction between clerks and managers
was not as clear as it is today, as managers often processed information themselves. There-
fore, in the empirical analysis I consider the diﬀerential eﬀect of complexity on managers
and clerks.
Tasks of processing information are typically skill-intensive, so clerks are typically more
skilled than most other manufacturing workers. The earliest nationally representative micro
data that identifies the education and occupation of individuals is the 1940 Census. Appendix
Table A2 shows the education of clerks and other workers, over age 50, who were employed
in manufacturing in 1940. Clerks had much higher levels of education than other workers,
suggesting that even if we account for changes in occupation and industry and attrition from
the labor force, clerks were highly educated workers in the early decades of the 20th century.9
Table A2 also shows that the skill gap between clerks and other workers persisted at least
through 1980, although it has narrowed over time.
The model predicts that when firms use high information intensity, more complex indus-
9Goldin and Katz (1999) show that clerks were much better educated than blue collar workers in Iowa in
1915.
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tries employ more clerks relative to other workers. In order to test this hypothesis I use
individual-level census data to estimate a linear probability model:
cij = αtj + z0iβ + εij, (17)
where cij is an indicator for person i, working in industry j, being employed as a clerk (or
a manager). The regressor of interest is industry j’s complexity, tj. I also include individual
level geographic controls (zi).10
The top panel of Table 2 shows results of cross-section regressions without industry-level
controls for each decade from 1900-2000. These results suggest that since 1910, more complex
industries have employed more clerks. An increase of one standard deviation in complexity
was associated with an increase of about 1.6 percentage points in the employment of clerks in
1910. This partial correlation increased to about 2.9 percentage points in 1960 and declined
to about 1 percentage point in 2000. In other words, from 1910-1980 a change in one standard
deviation of complexity corresponded to 15-25 percent of the average clerical employment
in manufacturing, declining to 8-13 percent in 1990 and 2000. The results are similar in
magnitude, though less precise, after controlling for the capital/labor ratio. Table 2 also
shows that managerial employment, unlike clerical employment, was not correlated with
higher complexity in 1910 and 1920, and it was substantially weaker throughout the first
half of the 20th century.11 This lends evidence that clerks and managers performed diﬀerent
tasks even in the early 20th century, so the demand for their services was driven by diﬀerent
factors.
The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the hypothesis that the coordination
of a more complex production process requires relatively more clerks, but I cannot rule out
10Specifications controlling for industry-level ratios of capital to labor give similar coeﬃcients for 1910 and
1960-1990. However, the estimate for 1910 is not significant at the 5 percent level.
11The relationship between complexity and managerial employment became significant from 1940 onwards,
with a change of one standard deviation in complexity associated with 0.4-1.5 percentage points (10-20
percent change) in managerial employment. Interestingly, the correlation between complexity and managerial
employment has strengthened in recent decades.
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reverse causality. Since the ranking of industries by complexity is stable over time, it is
diﬃcult to find an exogenous source of variation in complexity. I therefore examine if more
complex industries increased their demand for clerks more rapidly as an early decline in the
eﬀective price of IT equipment caused firms to switch from low information intensity to high
information intensity.
3.2 An Early IT Revolution: 1880-1910
This section discusses the early IT revolution, which took place from 1880-1910. I show that
this revolution increased the demand for clerks, and that industries that were more complex
to begin with increased their demand more rapidly. I also show that the demand for clerks
cannot be explained by variations in plant size across industries.
Yates (1989) and Levenstein (1991) describe the IT equipment that came into widespread
use in oﬃces from 1880-1910. The new IT equipment had substantial impact on four diﬀerent
aspects of information processing: production, copying, storage, and communication.12
First, the production of information was enhanced by the advent of the typewriter, which
allowed rapid and inexpensive generation of neat documents. The patent that led to the first
commercially viable typewriter was registered in 1868. During the 1870s the first typewriters
were sold to court reporters and telegraphers. Once the value of typewriters was realized
by firms, their production expanded rapidly, and in 1900 alone over 140,000 machines were
sold. The average annual growth rate of the real value of typewriters produced in the U.S.
from 1890-1909 was 9 percent, and it fell to 3 percent over the subsequent five years (see
Figure 2). Complementary innovations, such as the visible typewriter and the dictaphone,
allowed typists to see their output as they typed and to record dictations. Cash registers
and other oﬃce machines also became popular, and from 1890-1909 the real value of such
equipment grew at an average rate of 16 percent; the growth rate fell to a mere 3 percent
over the subsequent five years.13
12Broadberry and Ghosal (2002) consider the productivity consequences of the adoption of these oﬃce
technologies.
13The data on output comes from Roy (1990). Following Goldin and Katz (1995), Table 5, I use the
13
Second, the technology for copying information also improved from 1880-1910. Earlier
copying technologies, such as the book press and the rolling press, suﬀered from substantial
drawbacks, and carbon paper was incompatible with contemporary pens. With the advent of
typewriters, carbon paper allowed clerks to produce several copies at the point of origin. This
innovation reduced copying cost and made documents neater and more durable. Stencils,
first patented in 1876, became useful for mass duplication of internal communication. The
first photocopying machine was invented in 1900, and in 1911 the Taft Commission evaluated
it and found it useful for repeated copying of complicated documents and diagrams. The
widespread use of technologies for producing and copying information increased the use of
paper. From 1890-1910, the tonnage of fine writing paper manufactured in the U.S. grew
at a rate of 6.4 percent per capita, compared to 4.8 percent from 1910-1930 (Feenberg and
Miron 1997).
Third, the technology for storage and retrieval of information was quite limited before the
last decades of the 19th century. Documents were typically stored in pigeonhole desks that
could only accommodate few documents, or in cabinets and flat files that made retrieval
diﬃcult. Vertical filing was presented to the business world at Chicago’s World Fair of
1893. It allowed systematic grouping of documents, quick rearrangement and retrieval, and
substantial saving in storage space.
Finally, the technology for communicating information also improved from 1880-1910.
The telegraph was introduced to America as early as the 1840s, but it proved less useful in
manufacturing than in the railroad industry (Chandler 1977). More important for manufac-
turing was the telephone, which was invented in 1876 and came into commercial use shortly
thereafter. By the 1890s private branch exchanges were used in cities across the U.S., and
around 1900 long distance communication become possible. Figure 2 shows that the annual
growth rate in phones per capita from 1880-1910 was about 16 percent; in the next decade it
fell to about 4 percent.14 According to data from the 1920s to the 1970s, about one-third of
cost-of-living index due to Rees as the price deflator (Historical Statistics 1997, series E186).
14Similarly, Sorkin (1980) finds that the number of telephone connections made by the Bell Company
14
the phones in the U.S. were used by businesses, and this fraction declined only slowly over
time (Historical Statistics 1997). The use of printed communication also grew rapidly: the
annual growth rate of the number of items sent by the U.S. Postal Service was about 5.4
percent from 1874-1910 and only about 1.6 percent from 1910-1970.15
Taken together, this evidence shows that an early information technology revolution took
place from 1880-1910. The key period for this revolution was the first decade of the 20th
century, when technologies for producing, copying, storing and communicating information
matured. This early IT revolution created the potential to use information much more
intensively than before.
Throughout most of the 19th century manufacturing firms made little systematic use of
information for coordination of production. Rather, firms were often managed by owners,
typically with the help of skilled artisans or foremen (Chandler 1977; Hounshell 1984; Yates
1989; Nelson 1995). To be sure, there were exceptional firms that employed innovative
techniques of cost accounting; but these techniques were typically firm-specific and suﬀered
from substantial shortcomings (Fleischmen and Tyson 1993).
During the late 19th century, a group of managers and engineers led a movement for
“Systematic Management” (Nelson 1980, 1995).16 They promoted systematic cost account-
ing, use of job cards and time clocks, inventory control, centralized purchasing, and incentive
wages. Management literature had barely existed before 1870, but it expanded rapidly dur-
ing the next thirty years. It was also around the turn of the century that several American
universities first established programs in business administration. The next step in expand-
ing the use of information was taken by the movement for "Scientific Management", led by
Frederick W. Taylor. Taylor and his associates served as consultants and initiated changes in
plant management practices. These changes included mechanical innovations, improved cost
increased from 1.87 billion to 8.14 billion from 1900-1910. In per capita terms, this reflects an average
annual growth rate of about 14 percent during the first decade of the 20th century, compared to 2.3% in the
subsequent decade and an average growth rate of about 3.5% from 1920-1970.
15Author’s calculations are based on data from Bangs (1875) and Sorkin (1980).
16The availability of new power sources (steam and later electric power) also allowed more flexibility in
organizing the factory floor, and complemented these changes.
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accounting and purchasing systems, the introduction of storerooms and planning depart-
ments, use of time studies, and more sophisticated incentive wage systems. While neither
universally adopted nor entirely successful, these changes were a sign of the attempts to use
information for managerial purposes.
Most of the literature on this organizational transformation has focused on the managers
who initiated them (e.g. Chandler 1977 and Nelson 1995), but the role of clerks in facilitating
these changes was no less important. As Table 1 shows, production workers accounted for
about 95 percent of the manufacturing workforce in 1880, while most of the remaining 5
percent were managers and owners. But by 1910 clerks emerged as a new class of white
collar employees in the manufacturing industries, outnumbering managers by about two-to-
three.17
Existing data on wages suggest that on average clerks earned almost twice as much as
other manufacturing workers in 1890, reflecting their higher level of education at a time
when high school graduates were scarce.18 As Figure 4 shows, the wage of clerks relative to
other manufacturing workers appears to have remained constant or even increased slightly
from 1890-1910, while clerical employment increased rapidly. This consistent with the view
that the changes in clerical employment reflect a large increase in the relative demand for
clerks.
The growth in demand for clerks raised the demand for skilled workers when high-school
education was still scarce (Goldin and Katz 1995), and this change may have contributed
to the onset of the high-school movement in subsequent decades (see Goldin 1998). The
increased demand for clerks also had important implications for the employment of women:
although men filled the majority of new clerical jobs in manufacturing created by 1910,
17Estimates using the IPUMS data and the 1950 occupational definitions suggest that there were about
18,000-20,000 clerks in manufacturing in 1870 and 1880. This figure corresponds to about 1 percent of
the manufacturing labor force. The 1950 classification of clerical occupations appears to match earlier
classification systems well only for data from 1880 onwards, so estimates prior to 1880 are potentially
subject to substantial measurement error. The Census of Manufactures uses a narrower definition of clerical
occupations than the population census. According to these definitions there were fewer than 6,000 and
12,000 clerks in manufacturing in 1870 and 1880.
18See Appendix Table A2 calculations based on Goldin and Katz (1998).
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clerical work became feminized after 1910.
In order to examine how the changes in demand for clerks varied by industry, I use the
measure of complexity introduced in the previous section. The model predicts that more
complex industries increase their employment of clerks more rapidly than other industries,
assuming that complexity ranking of industries is stable over time. To test this hypothesis
I estimate a pooled cross-section regression for 1880, 1900, and 1910:
cijt = α(tj,1880 ∗ It) + x0jβ + z0iγ + d0jδ + T 0tλ+ εijt, (18)
where tj,1880 is the complexity of industry j in 1880, It is a dummy for 1910 (after
the information technology revolution had matured), xj includes industry-level controls, xj
controls for industry level covariates, dj is a vector of industry fixed eﬀects, and Tt is a vector
of year dummies.
As the results in Table 3 show, industries that were more complex in 1880 increased
their employment of clerks more rapidly than other industries over the next three decades.
These results are robust to diﬀerent weighting methods (columns 1 and 2). Column 3 limits
the sample to industries with large plants. The coeﬃcient of interest, α, is larger and more
precise, suggesting that my results are not driven by industries with small and heterogenous
plants. In a similar vein, I exclude industries that are loosely defined (e.g. miscellaneous
wood products), and the results are similar to the benchmark. The results are also robust to
including only industries with more than 100 observations in 1880 (column 5). Finally I use
an alternative measure of complexity, computed using only production workers; once again,
the results are similar (column 6). These results suggest that an increase of one standard
deviation of complexity in 1880 corresponds to an increase of about 1-2 percentage points (or
about about 15-30 percent) in the employment of clerks in 1910, similar to the cross-sectional
estimates.19 By comparison, the estimated eﬀect of complexity on the relative employment
19Cross-section and panel regressions using industry variations in average plant size show that it is uncor-
related with employment of clerks. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that the growth in firm size
discussed in Chandler (1977) may have contributed to the increased demand for clerks.
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of managers is positive but substantially smaller, and only marginally significant.
This evidence suggests that complexity, rather than plant size, was the important deter-
minant of demand for clerks around the turn of the 20th century. The next section examines
how complex industries responded to changes in the eﬀective price of IT equipment that
took place in recent decades.
3.3 A Recent IT Revolution: 1960-2000
The computer revolution that has taken place in recent decades shares much in common with
the IT revolution that occurred around the turn of the 20th century. First, computer software
(e.g. word processors and electronic spreadsheets) and hardware (e.g. printers) substantially
reduce the cost of producing information, just as the typewriter had done almost one century
earlier. Second, computers allow us to copy information at almost no cost. Third, computers
allow eﬀective storage and retrieval of vast amounts of information. And finally, computer
networks make communication cheaper and more eﬀective, as the telephone had done in the
past.
In 1970 there were fewer than 75,000 computers in the U.S., but over the next decade
about 875,000 computers were purchased (Phister 1979; Hunt and Hunt 1986). Substantial
reduction in the cost of processing power (Jorgenson 2001; Nordhaus 2001) induced a transi-
tion from mainframe computers to microcomputers. The range of computer applications also
increased over time. By 1984 nearly half of the clerks in the U.S. used computers, compared
to only a quarter of other workers; more recent data show that the fraction of clerks (and
other workers) using computers has since continued to rise (Friedberg 2003). I therefore
conclude that during the 1970s (and possibly the early 1980s) the price of oﬃce computers
declined sharply, and we can examine the eﬀect of this decline on the demand for clerks.
The new IT equipment reduced the demand for clerks in three diﬀerent ways (Hunt and
Hunt 1986; Osterman 1986). First, new equipment has directly replaced clerical workers . For
example, automatic switching replaced telephone operators; oﬃce dictation equipment took
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the place of stenographers; computer software for pricing insurance supplanted specialized
clerks (raters); automatic mail sorting devices replaced mail clerks; and computerized inven-
tory management software took the place of shipping and receiving clerks. Second, indirect
replacement occurred as the new equipment raised the productivity of clerical work, reducing
the number of clerks required to perform a given task. Finally, reorganization of information
processing has also reduced the demand for clerks. For example, some stenographers and
typists lost their jobs when word processing allowed workers to produce information cheaply
and eﬃciently.20
As Table 1 shows, the fraction of clerks in the manufacturing workforce fell from 14.4
percent in 1960 to 11.4 percent in 2000. This decline does not reflect an increase in the
relative wages of clerks. As Appendix Table A3 shows, the wage of clerks relative to other
manufacturing workers has gradually fallen over this period. Taken together, this evidence
suggests manufacturers’ demand for clerk, relative to other workers, has been falling.
Of particular interest is the eﬀect is the diﬀerential response of complex industries to the
fall in the price of IT equipment. The first four columns in Table 4 show the cross-sectional
relation between complexity and the employment of computer personnel from 1970-2000.21
The coeﬃcient is positive in all years, although it is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level only for 1980 and 2000 and marginally significant for 1970 and 1990. These results are
consistent with the model’s prediction that more complex industries have higher demand for
information technology equipment.
Given the persistence of complexity, the model predicts that more complex industries
substitute IT equipment for clerks more rapidly than other industries. Assuming that the
number of computer operators required for each computer does not vary across industries
in each year, we expect that higher complexity leads to greater employment of computer
20Osterman (1986) argues that these factors might be at least partially oﬀset by "informa-
tion deepening", as firms may use more information relative to other intermediate inputs.
21See Data Appendix for a definition of the category of "computer personnel."
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personnel. Table 4 shows the results of the following regression using data from 1960-1990:
cijt = α(tj,1960 ∗ It) + x0jβ + z0iγ + d0jδ + T 0tλ+ εijt, (19)
where tj,1960 is the complexity of industry j in 1960, It is a dummy for 1980 and 1990 (after
the computer revolution had matured), xj includes industry-level controls, dj is a vector
of industry fixed eﬀects and Tt is a vector of year eﬀects. The results suggest that more
complex industries significantly reduced their employment of clerks. An increase of one s.d.
in complexity in 1960 is associated with a decrease of about 1.3 percentage points in clerical
employment in 1980 and 1990.
Table 4 also shows that complex industries increased the demand for computer person-
nel more than other industries. However, this diﬀerential increase was only about 1/20 in
magnitude compared to the decline in their employment of clerks. In part, this finding may
reflect the fact that a single computer operator may be in charge of multiple computers or
multiple user interfaces. It may also reflect the capacity of a single computer operator to
substitute multiple clerks that are not using computers. Finally, it is also possible that some
jobs may have been outsourced to service providers outside manufacturing.22
In summary, these findings show that manufacturing industries substituted computer
personnel for clerks, and that this substitution was significantly stronger among more com-
plex industries. The next section compares the relationship between complexity and demand
for information processing in the US and Mexico.
3.4 Comparing USA and Mexico in 1990
In this section I use data from IPUMS International to examine the relationship between
complexity and demand for information processing in the US and Mexico in 1990. This
approach sheds light on the hypothesis that diﬀerences in complexity are largely due to
22Interestingly, complex industries also appear to have increased their demand for managers more than
other industries. This finding suggests that they may face more challenges in coordinating complex produc-
tion processes, even when plenty of information is available.
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underlying technological diﬀerences, and it allows us to compare the diﬀerences in complexity
and information processing across economies that are in diﬀerent stages of development.
I also use the 1990 US data to examine a subgroup of clerks engaged more directly in
coordination, and I test whether it is
The top panel in Table 5 compares manufacturing industries in the US and Mexico in
1990. The data uses harmonized definitions of industries, but each country’s occupational
definitions are diﬀerent (See Data Appendix).23 Despite these diﬀerences, the summary sta-
tistics are consistent with the hypothesis that diﬀerences in complexity reflect technological
variations. The average complexity in Mexico is lower than the US; industry-by-industry
comparisons show that the complexity of Mexican industries is higher in only 8 of the 44
industries. Moreover, the correlation in industry-level complexity across the two countries is
about 0.3.
Consistent with the hypothesis that complexity aﬀects demand for information process-
ing, The Mexico had fewer clerks than the US and also fewer managers. As the bottom
panel of Table 5 shows, the relationship between complexity and the fraction of clerks (and
managers) was highly significant in both economies. Interestingly, in Mexico, complexity
was more strongly associated with clerical employment, as it had been in the US in past
decades. By contrast, in the US complexity was more strongly associated with managerial
employment. Although a full investigation of these issues is outside the scope of the current
paper, this finding suggests that in the highly complex production environment we face to-
day, the cost of a more detailed division of labor may be increasingly due to the diﬃculty of
analyzing information and coordinating production, rather than processing information.
Like all the analysis thus far, the comparison of US and Mexican data relies on a broad
definition of clerical occupations. Although the tasks of most of the clerical occupations are
defined in broad terms (e.g. secretaries, general oﬃce clerks), the occupational classifications
23The total number of occupations in the two countries is very similar. When excluding managers, clerks,
and misclassified workers there are 354 occupations in the US data and 367 occupations in the Mexican data.
Note also that the results are robust to restricting the US sample size to the same size as the Mexican data.
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of the 1990 US data identify some clerical occupations ("coordination" clerks) that are
particularly related to processing information that is used to coordinate production. We
can compare those "other" clerical occupations that are less related to the coordination of
production, and to the larger residual category of "general" clerks.24
As Table 6 shows, complexity is most strongly associated with the employment of co-
ordination clerks. One standard deviation in complexity is associated with an increase of
11 percent in the employment share of coordination clerks, compared to about 6 percent
and 4 percent of general and other clerks. This evidence provides further support for the
relationship between coordination and demand for information processing.
4 Conclusions
In this paper I analyze the cost of processing information that is used to coordinate complex
production processes. One contribution of this paper is in constructing and analyzing a
measure of the complexity of the division of labor, which measures the extent of occupational
heterogeneity in an industry’s workforce. Using US data on manufacturing industries over
more than a century I find evidence that this measure is highly persistent, likely reflecting
underlying diﬀerences in the production process across industries. A comparison of recent
data from US and Mexico reveals that US industries are more complex, and within each
country the rankings of industries by complexity are similar.
I find evidence that more complex industries employ relatively more clerks, and that
this correlation is consistent and robust for almost a century. Mexican data for 1990 shows
similarly strong evidence.
In order to further document the eﬀect of complexity on the demand for clerks, I examine
an early IT Revolution that took place from 1880-1910. The sharp decline in the eﬀective
price of IT induced firms to use information more intensively, by employing both clerks and
24"Coordination" clerks are: production coordinators; stock and inventory clerks; personnel clerks; and
payroll and timekeeping clerks. "Other" clerks are: transportation ticket and reservation agents; recep-
tionists; order clerks; billing clerks; dispatchers; weighers, measurers, and checkers; and investigators and
adjusters, except insurance. The residual catgory includes the rest of the clerical occupations.
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IT equipment. This finding suggests that by increasing the demand for clerks, technological
change may have contributed to the onset of the High School Movement from 1910 onwards
and to women’s integration into the labor force. Interestingly, I find that industries which
were more complex in 1880, when there was very little employment of clerks, increased their
demand for clerks significantly more than other industries.
Whereas in the past clerks and IT equipment were complements, in recent decades they
have become substitutes. I find that manufacturing firms have substituted computers for
clerks, reducing the employment share of clerks despite the decline in their relative wages.
This result provides a concrete case in which technology and a specific set of skills are
substitutes rather than complements. Moreover, my findings suggest that the replacement
of clerks by computers was more rapid in more complex industries.
Lastly, this paper assesses the extent to which complexity increases demand for clerks. I
find that one standard deviation in complexity is associated with an increase of 1 percentage
point (about 8 percent) in the employment of clerks. In recent decades, complexity has
also become strongly associated with the employment of managers: an increase of 1 s.d. in
complexity is associated with an increase of 1.4 percentage points (about 14 percent) in the
employment of managers. The results suggest that the complexity of the production process
is an important determinant of the demand for white-collar workers.
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Data Appendix
The data for this paper comes primarily from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) samples of the U.S. decennial household census. This data includes samples of
approximately 1 percent of the decennial US census from 1860-2000, excluding 1890 and
1930, for which no data is currently available. This data allows a systematic cross-sectional
and longitudinal analysis of the manufacturing workforce, while controlling for geographic
variation. Using the IPUMS 1950 classification of occupations and industries mitigates some
of the problems that could arise from changes in the classification of jobs throughout the
period.25 Nevertheless, before 1880 people were not directly asked for both their occupation
and industry, so the distinction between the two had to be imputed and this created a
potential for substantial measurement error. This data also lacks the wage and educational
attainment of workers before 1940.26 In order to obtain wage data for that period, I rely on
the estimates of Goldin and Katz (1995), which are based on partial data.
I include workers in all manufacturing industries, except for ‘miscellaneous manufactur-
ing industries’ and ‘not specified manufacturing industries’. Dropping these observations
reduced the sample by about 5 percent. Specific occupations that appeared in the data but
seem incompatible with employment in manufacturing were excluded from the sample. These
occupations include: chiropractors; clergymen; dancers and dancing teachers; entertainers;
farm and home management advisors; foresters and conservationists; funeral directors and
embalmers; recreation and group workers; religious workers; therapists and healers; farm-
ers (owners and tenants); farm managers; auctioneers; hucksters and peddlers; real estate
25In the classification of industries, I merged together several industries, in order to facilitate the merg-
ing of the household census data with the census of manufactures data. Specifically, I merged industries
306 (logging) and 307 (sawmills, planing mills, and mill work); industries 336 (blast furnaces, steel works,
and rolling mills) and 337 (other primary iron and steel industries); industries 346 (fabricated steel prod-
ucts) and 347 (fabricated nonferrous metal products); industries 439 (yarn, thread, and fabric mills), 436
(miscellaneous textile mill products) and 449 (miscellaneous fabricated textile products); and industries 399
(miscellaneous manufacturing industries) and 499 (not specified manufacturing industries). I also dropped
all the observations that are classified as: employed, unclassifiable; non-occupational response; occupation
missing/unknown; and N/A (blank).
26The schooling variable does make it possible to estimate high school participation across geographical
regions.
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agents and brokers; stock and bond salesmen; all service workers; all farm laborers; people
whose occupation was unclassified; people with a non-occupational response; and all people
with occupation missing/unknown or non-available. Dropping all these occupations further
reduced the sample by about 3 percent.
The only industry-level variable constructed using the IPUMS data is the complexity
measure. It is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of occupations, excluding man-
agers, clerks and accountants and auditors. In some specifications I also use an alternative
measure of complexity, calculated using only production workers (Craftsmen, Operatives,
and Laborers not elsewhere classified).
I construct other industry-level variables using the Census of Manufactures data for
the years 1880-1909 and 1960-1990. The data for the early period includes the number of
workers and establishments, as well as the value of output and cost of various inputs for over
250 industries, as classified by Roy (1990). The more recent data is from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman et al. 2000).
The household census and the Census of Manufactures data use diﬀerent classifications of
industries and the latter classification is typically much more detailed. In order to match the
data I pooled together several of the IPUMS industries: logging was merged with sawmills,
planing mills, and mill work; blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills was merged with
other primary iron and steel industries; yarn, thread, and fabric mills was merged with
miscellaneous textile mill products and miscellaneous fabricated textile products. Merging
these industries yielded a total of 52 industries, although a few had no observations in some
census years.
Under the IPUMS classification of occupations, all white collar workers are classified into
one of four one-digit categories: clerks, managers, professional workers and sales workers. I
constructed the category of computer personnel based on the IPUMS occupations for 1970-
2000 since no such category existed prior to 1970. In 1970 this category includes computer
and peripheral equipment operators. In 1980 and 1990 it includes supervisors, computer
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equipment operators; computer operators; and peripheral equipment operators. In 2000 it
includes computer and information systems managers; database administrators; network and
computer systems administrators; and computer operators.
The analysis in section 6 uses US and Mexican data on occupations and industries in
1990 from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-International. I exclude various US
miscellaneous industries: Toys, amusement, and sporting goods; Miscellaneous manufac-
turing industries; and Manufacturing industries, n.s., and similar Mexican industries: Not
suﬃciently specified industries, and Other manufacturing industries. Appendix Table A4
shows the matching of US and Mexican industries. The calculations exclude managers,
administrative workers, and farm workers.
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Clerks Managers
Professional 
workers
Sales 
workers
Computer 
administrators 
and operators 
(see note)
All white 
collar 
workers
1860 0.9 0.001 0.022 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.400
1870 1.6 0.012 0.031 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.089 0.438
1880 1.8 0.011 0.033 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.052 0.046 0.361
1900 3.8 0.026 0.035 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.071 0.173 0.583
1910 7.6 0.064 0.043 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.128 0.357 0.684
1920 9.1 0.083 0.039 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.139 0.450 0.688
1940 11.1 0.103 0.041 0.030 0.031 0.000 0.205 0.428 0.679
1950 14.6 0.113 0.047 0.042 0.023 0.000 0.223 0.542 0.714
1960 21.4 0.144 0.044 0.062 0.026 0.000 0.275 0.690 0.696
1970 24.4 0.140 0.045 0.081 0.023 0.002 0.290 0.697 0.716
1980 25.5 0.131 0.066 0.090 0.022 0.005 0.309 0.691 0.755
1990 23.4 0.124 0.096 0.121 0.030 0.007 0.370 0.696 0.791
2000 23.1 0.114 0.099 0.138 0.030 0.007 0.381 0.667 0.775
NOTES: The sample includes workers in the manufacturing industries, as described in the Data Appendix. Using the IPUMS 1950 classification of occupations, 
all white collar workers fall into one of the following categories: clerks, managers, professional workers and sales workers. The category of computer 
administrators and operators includes some clerks, managers and professional workers (see details in Data Appendix). The complexity measure is computed as 
one minus the Herfindahl index of occupations, excluding managers, clerks and accountants and auditors. Means are calculated using census person weights.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Year Fraction of white collar occupations in manufacturingTotal 
manufacturing 
workforce 
(millions)
Fraction of 
women 
among 
clerks
Average 
industry 
complexity
1900 1910 1920 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Complexity -0.003 0.102 0.086 0.111 0.107 0.136 0.151 0.157 0.139 0.106
-(0.020) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045) (0.049) (0.044)
Complexity -0.017 -0.010 -0.034 0.039 0.024 0.039 0.052 0.083 0.128 0.156
(0.028) (0.025) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
19,080 30,018 90,504 112,424 170,925 214,951 243,983 255,021 237,953 233,649
Table 2. Complexity and Industry-level Employment Shares of Clerks and Managers: 1900-2000
NOTES: The sample includes workers in the manufacturing industries, as described in the Data Appendix. The complexity measure is computed as one minus the 
herfindahl index of occupations, excluding managers, clerks and accountants and auditors. All the regressions include state dummies. Dummies for the size of 
place in which the person lived were included in the years for which this information was available (1900, 1910, 1940, 1950, 1980, 1990). All regressions are 
weighted (using person-weights). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry level.
A. Clerks
Observations
B. Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Complexity in 1880) x (Year=1910) 0.048 0.051 0.082 0.037 0.049 0.066
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Ln(capital / labor) -0.012 -0.014 -0.047 -0.010 -0.012 -0.019
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Ln(average establishment size) -0.008 -0.005 -0.024 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year=1900 0.019 0.018 0.039 0.021 0.019 0.023
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year=1910 0.034 0.032 0.062 0.039 0.033 0.036
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
(Complexity in 1880) x (Year=1910) 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.009 0.017 0.017
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Ln(capital / labor) 0.007 0.007 -0.009 0.011 0.008 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln(average establishment size) 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year=1900 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Year=1910 -0.011 -0.008 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 66,473 66,473 39,950 50,309 60,452 66,473
Table 3. Effect of Complexity in 1880 on Employment of Clerks and Managers in 1910
NOTES: The sample includes workers in the manufacturing industries, as described in the Data Appendix, for the years 1880, 1900, and 1910. The complexity 
measure is computed as one minus the herfindahl index of occupations, excluding managers, clerks and accountants and auditors. All regressions include 
industry fixed effects and city size dummies. The column specifications are: (1) Benchmark specification (sum of person weights is one for each year); (2) 
Standard person weights; (3) Only industries above median in terms of 1880 estaqblishment size; (4) Excludes "miscellaneous" industries; (5) Includes only 
industries with more than 100 observations in 1880; (6) Complexity calculated using only production workers (Craftsmen, Operatives, Laborers n.e.c.). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering by industry*(Year=1910).
A. Clerks
B. Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Clerks Computer personnel Managers
Year(s) 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960-1990 1960-1990 1960-1990
Complexity 0.0021 0.0070 0.0099 0.0174
(0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0057) (0.0057)
-0.0650 0.0028 0.0236
(0.0078) (0.0011) (0.0060)
Ln(capital/labor) 0.0002 0.0027 0.0285
(0.0086) (0.0014) (0.0084)
Year=1970 -0.0095 0.0008 -0.0065
(0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0030)
Year=1980 0.0245 0.0012 -0.0120
(0.0052) (0.0009) (0.0053)
Year=1990 0.0108 0.0020 0.0063
(0.0071) (0.0012) (0.0066)
City size dummies No Yes Yes No No No No
Industry dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 242,389 254,621 237,407 233,649 948,662 948,662 948,662
(Complexity in 1960) x 
(year=1980 or 1990)
Computer personnel
Table 4. Employment Shares of Clerks, Managers and Computer Personnel: 1960-2000
NOTES: The sample includes workers in the manufacturing industries, as described in the Data Appendix. The complexity measure is computed as one minus 
the herfindahl index of occupations, excluding managers, clerks and accountants and auditors. All regressions are weighted (using person-weights) and they all 
include state dummies. Dummies for the size of place in which the person lived were included in the years for which this information was available (1980 and 
1990). Regressions (5)-(7) use normalized weights, such that the sum of weights in each year is equal to one. Robust standard errors for columns the columns 
(1)-(4) are clustered at the industry level and for columns (5)-(7) they are clustered at the industry*(year=1980 or 1990) level.
USA Mexico
Clerks 0.112 0.088
(0.029) (0.040)
Managers 0.104 0.035
(0.037) (0.015)
Complexity 0.938 0.881
(0.055) (0.113)
Industries 44 44
USA Mexico
Complexity 0.148 0.190
(0.021) (0.032)
Complexity 0.231 0.060
(0.030) (0.008)
1,201,193 377,855
Table 5. Comparing USA and Mexico: 1990
NOTES: The sample includes the workers in the manufacturing industries, according to 
the IPUMS International 1990 classification of industries, except miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries and not specified manufacturing industries. Specific 
occupations that were likely the result of classification error are excluded from the 
sample, and the industry codes have been harmonized for the US and Mexico (see Data 
Appendix). The complexity measure is computed as one minus the herfindahl index of 
occupations, excluding managers, clerks and accountants and auditors. In panel A 
standard deviations are in parentheses. In panels B, robust standard errors, clustered by 
industry, are in parentheses.
Managers
Observations
Clerks
A. Summary Statistics
B. Regression Results
All Clerks Coordination Clerks General Clerks Other Clerks
0.117 0.017 0.088 0.012
(0.321) (0.128) (0.283) (0.108)
All Clerks Coordination Clerks General Clerks Other Clerks
LHS Variable: Complexity 0.111 0.027 0.078 0.006
(0.045) (0.008) (0.043) (0.008)
Complexity coefficient x 1.s.d. complexity 0.0078 0.0019 0.0054 0.0004
As percent of mean: 6.7 11.3 6.2 3.8
1,281,782 1,281,782 1,281,782 1,281,782
Table 6. Complexity and Different US Clerical Occupations: 1990
NOTES: The sample includes the workers in the manufacturing industries, according to the IPUMS International 1990 classification of industries, which 
includes 82 industries. Specific occupations that were likely the result of classification error are excluded from the sample (see Data Appendix). The complexity 
measure is computed as one minus the herfindahl index of occupations, excluding managers, clerks and accountants and auditors. Mean industry-level 
complexity is 0.924 and the standard deviation is 0.070. In panel A standard deviations are in parentheses. In panels B, robust standard errors, clustered by 
industry, are in parentheses.
Observations
A. Summary Statistics
B. Regression Results
1880 1910 1940 1970 2000
1 Blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills
Printing, publishing, and 
allied industries
Ship and boat building 
and repairing
Ship and boat building 
and repairing
Ship and boat building 
and repairing
2 Drugs and medicines Petroleum refining Petroleum refining Petroleum refining Aircraft and parts
3 Primary nonferrous industries Fabricated steel products
Railroad and misc 
transportation equipment
Blast furnaces, steel 
works and rolling mills Petroleum refining
4 Printing, publishing, and allied industries
Railroad and misc 
transportation equipment Aircraft and parts Aircraft and parts Drugs and medicines
5 Professional equipment Agricultural machinery and tractors
Agricultural machinery 
and tractors
Cement, concrete, 
gypsum and plaster 
products
Railroad and misc 
transportation equipment
1
Cement, concrete, 
gypsum and plaster 
products
Tobacco manufactures Footwear, except rubber Apparel and accessories Apparel and accessories
2 Knitting mills Leather products, except footwear Knitting mills Knitting mills
Carpets, rugs, and other 
floor coverings
3 Petroleum refining Footwear, except rubber Apparel and accessories Footwear, except rubber Leather products, except footwear
4
Canning and preserving 
fruits, vegetables, and 
seafoods
Knitting mills Leather products, except footwear
Leather products, except 
footwear
Paperboard containers 
and boxes
5 Confectionary and related products
Paperboard containers 
and boxes Tobacco manufactures
Canning and preserving 
fruits, vegetables, and 
seafoods
Rubber products
Appendix Table A1. Industries with High and Low Levels of Complexity: 1880-2000
Highest levels of complexity
Lowest levels of complexity
NOTES: The sample includes the manufacturing industries, accoring to the IPUMS 1950 classification of industries. Industries with vague classification and 
industries that had fewer than 10 observations in a given year were excluded from this table.
Clerks Non-clerks Clerks Non-clerks Clerks Non-clerks
Education level:
No high school 0.46 0.77 0.20 0.57 0.04 0.14
Some high school 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.22
High school graduates 0.24 0.08 0.44 0.16 0.49 0.37
Some college 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.27 0.17
College graduates 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.11
Appendix Table A2. Education of Clerks and Other Workers in Manufacturing
NOTES: The sample includes workers in manufacturing industries, and it is described in detail in the Data Appendix.  The means are calculated using census 
person weights.
1940 1980
Age 50 and over No age restriction No age restriction
Men Women Men Women
1890 1.85
1895 1.69 1.94
1909 1.65 1.96
1914 1.70 2.07
1919 1.20 1.53
1924 1.10 1.40
1929 1.13 1.53
1939 1.15 1.56
1939 0.89 1.12 1.12 1.70
1949 0.97 0.99 1.02 1.30
1959 0.90 0.91 1.10 1.23
1969 0.89 0.86 1.10 1.21
1979 0.87 0.87 1.06 1.19
1989 0.82 0.80 0.97 1.01
1999 0.77 0.74 0.91 0.89
Annual earnings of clerks relative to production workers
Appendix Table A3. Wages of Clerks in Manufacturing
NOTES: The estimates in Panel A are taken from Table 5 in Goldin and Katz (1995), and they are based in part on sources that are not nationally 
representative. The estimates in Panel B are based on the author's calculations from IPUMS data. The earnings premium for clerks is defined as the ratio of the 
median annual earnings of clerks and non-clerks in manufacturing industries.
Wage premium of clerks relative to production workers
B. 1939-1999
A. 1890-1939
Industry name US industry codes Mexico industry codes
Meat and Fish products 100 31001 31002
Dairy products 101 31003 31004
Fruit and vegetable products 102 31005
Grain mill products 110 31008 31006
Bakery products 111 31007 31011
Sugar and confectionery products 112 31015 31016 31017
Beverage industries 120 31031 31032 31033 31012
Misc. food preparations and kindred products 121 31013 31014 31021 31022
Food industries, n.s. 122 31099
Tobacco manufactures 130 31041
Textile mill products 140 141 142 150 31101 31102
Apparel and accessories 151 132 31105 31106
Fabricated textile products 152 31104 31111 31103 31199
Paper products 160 161 162 32001 32099
Publishing and printing 171 172 32011
Plastics, synthetics, and resins 180 32105
Drugs 181 32111
Soaps and cosmetics 182 32113 32114
Paints, varnishes, and related products 190 32112
Agricultural chemicals 191 32104
Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals 192 32103 32115 32116
Petroleum refining 200 32121
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 201 32131 32132 32101 32102
Rubber products 210 211 32141
Plastics products 212 32151 32152
Leather products 220 222 31201
Footwear, except rubber and plastic 221 31211
Wood products, other than furniture 230 231 232 241 31301 31321 31399
Furniture and fixtures 242 31311
Glass and glass products 250 32211
Construction materials 251 252 32221 32202 32222
Pottery and related products 261 32201
Misc. nonmetallic mineral and stone products 262 32299
Primary Iron and steel industries 270 271 32301 32401
Primary non-ferrous metal industries 272 32311
Other primary metal industries 280 32399
Fabricated metal products 281 282 290 291 292 300 301 32402 32403 32404
Misc. mechanical machinery 310 311 312 320 331 332 32441
Office and accounting machines 321 322 32413
Professional instruments and equipment 371 372 380 381 32411 32412
Household appliances 340 32423
Misc. electronic equipment 341 342 350 32422
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 351 32431 32421
Misc. transportation equipment 352 360 361 362 370 32432
NOTES: Data is from IPUMS International, 1990 Classification of industries for USA and Mexico
Appendix Table A4. USA and Mexican Industry Codes, 1990
Figure 1. Percentage of clerks in workforce as a function of complexity: 1880-2000. Source: author's calculations.
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Figure 2. Diffusion of information technology equipment during the early IT revolution. Source: author's calculations 
based on the Census of Manufactures.
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Clerks Managers Professional and Sales
Figure 3. Fraction of white-collar workers in manufacturing, by occupational class. Source: author's calculations.
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Figure 4. Wages of clerks relative to production workers in manufacturing: 1880-2000. Broken lines denote data from 
before 1940, which are not nationally representative. Sources: see Appendix Table A2.
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